BumbleBee

Close-up of a bumblebee on a yellow flower

BumbleBee Operator executes Piece-by-Piece .PS1

Introduction

In this article I will be analyzing a recent Bumblebee campaign that impersonates DocuSign. I will cover the execution chain, the PowerShell loader, and some Indicators of Compromise (IOCs).

Context

BumbleBee is a malware loader. A loader like this is early-stage malware: once it runs, it contacts its command-and-control (C2) servers and downloads whatever the operators want to run next, commonly a post-exploitation framework such as Cobalt Strike or another malware family. A loader infection is therefore usually the start of an intrusion, not the end of it.

The Sample

The lure is classic malvertising with a .zip and a password into a .img (not to be confused with an actual image extension like .jpg or .png)

Phishing email with the subject DocuSign Documents sent: a DocuSign-styled notice with a SEE THE DOCUMENT button, and the archive password RD4432 highlighted in the message body
The phishing email, with the archive password in the body

Hovering over the “See The Document” link reveals the URL:

The DocuSign-styled email with the SEE THE DOCUMENT button outlined in red, and the status bar showing the link target, a OneDrive download URL
The button links to a OneDrive download

The de-horned URL is:

hxxps://onedrive.live[.]com/download?cid=0F6CD861E2193F6E&resid=F6CD861E2193F6E%21118&authkey=ALbZV_c_Tn7O-OA

Instead of redirecting to the actual DocuSign site, the file is hosted on OneDrive, triggering an automatic download of an archive file upon clicking.

Threat Chain

Below is the execution chain as I mapped it, from the moment the phishing email is opened:

Execution chain diagram: phishing mail, button click, auto-download from OneDrive, password-protected ZIP (password RD4432), IMG file containing a shortcut named requested information and a hidden .ps1 file; the shortcut executes the .ps1, which loads an embedded DLL that loads BumbleBee
Execution chain

Let’s quickly go through these steps:

  • The downloaded archive is opened by the user. To extract the IMG file, the user must enter the provided password: RD4432.
    WinRAR prompting for the password of the encrypted file 8702268950347.img inside 2. requested_documents_714407544541.zip, with RD4432 entered
    WinRAR asks for the password before extracting the IMG
  • Once the IMG file is opened, the user sees only the LNK file (the .ps1 script is hidden).
    Explorer showing the mounted image as DVD Drive (E:) with a documents folder and a 2 KB shortcut named requested information; the documents folder looks empty until Hidden items is enabled, which reveals documents.ps1 (2,300 KB)
    The mounted image with hidden items off (top) and on (bottom)
  • The LNK file will execute the hidden .ps1 script

Context

An .img file is a raw disk image. Since Windows 8, double-clicking one mounts it as a virtual drive, which Explorer lists as a DVD drive. Disk images are a popular delivery container because the files inside them have historically not inherited the Mark-of-the-Web, the Zone.Identifier stream that browsers and mail clients add to downloaded files, which is what triggers SmartScreen and Office Protected View warnings. The archive password adds a second layer: a mail or web gateway cannot look inside an encrypted archive without it. The .lnk file is an ordinary Windows shortcut: its target can be any program with arguments, such as powershell.exe and a script path, and Explorer never shows the .lnk extension, even with file name extensions turned on.

BumbleBee PowerShell .ps1

Now I turn to the script and the method used to extract the payload. The script contains approximately 42 base64 encoded strings (archives), each stored in a variable named elem{X}. For example:

PowerShell script text: $elem41 is assigned a long base64 string that begins b4sIAAAA
One of the base64 strings in the hidden script, $elem41

The script replaces the first character in each encoded string with 'H' to match the .gz magic bytes: 1f 8b.

Two PowerShell lines applied to $elem41: $elem41.$dbfbda.Invoke(0,1), then $elem41.$casda.Invoke(0,"H")
The two string operations applied to $elem41

Context

A gzip stream starts with the magic bytes 1f 8b and the deflate method byte 08, which together encode in base64 as H4sI, so changing the first character of the string is enough to break or restore the header. Splitting a payload into dozens of small encoded chunks with broken headers is a common way to frustrate static scanning: no single string decodes to a recognizable file, so signatures written for a gzip header or an executable have nothing to match until the script rebuilds the payload at run time.

Here’s the Python script I used to extract, decode, and save these strings:

from base64 import b64decode
import re
import os

PS1_FILE_PATH = '/Users/igal/malwares/bumblebee/21-02-2023/documents.ps1'
OUTPUT_FOLDER = '/Users/igal/malwares/bumblebee/21-02-2023/archives/'

REG_PATTERN = '^\$elem.*\=\"(.*)\"$'

archiveIndex = 0

if not os.path.exists(OUTPUT_FOLDER):
    os.makedirs(OUTPUT_FOLDER)

ps1File = open(PS1_FILE_PATH, 'rb').readlines()
for line in ps1File:
    regMatch = re.findall(REG_PATTERN, line.replace(b'\x00',b'').decode('iso-8859-1'))
    if regMatch:
        varData = b64decode('H' + regMatch[0][1:])
        open(f'{OUTPUT_FOLDER}/archive{archiveIndex}.gz', 'wb').write(varData)
        print(f'[+] gz archive was created in:{OUTPUT_FOLDER}/archive{archiveIndex}.gz')
        archiveIndex += 1

This results in multiple .gz archives being created:

[+] gz archive was created in:/Users/igal/malwares/bumblebee/21-02-2023/archives//archive0.gz
[+] gz archive was created in:/Users/igal/malwares/bumblebee/21-02-2023/archives//archive1.gz
[+] gz archive was created in:/Users/igal/malwares/bumblebee/21-02-2023/archives//archive2.gz
[+] gz archive was created in:/Users/igal/malwares/bumblebee/21-02-2023/archives//archive3.gz
[+] gz archive was created in:/Users/igal/malwares/bumblebee/21-02-2023/archives//archive4.gz
[+] gz archive was created in:/Users/igal/malwares/bumblebee/21-02-2023/archives//archive5.gz
[+] gz archive was created in:/Users/igal/malwares/bumblebee/21-02-2023/archives//archive6.gz
[+] gz archive was created in:/Users/igal/malwares/bumblebee/21-02-2023/archives//archive7.gz
[+] gz archive was created in:/Users/igal/malwares/bumblebee/21-02-2023/archives//archive8.gz
[+] gz archive was created in:/Users/igal/malwares/bumblebee/21-02-2023/archives//archive9.gz
[+] gz archive was created in:/Users/igal/malwares/bumblebee/21-02-2023/archives//archive10.gz
[+] gz archive was created in:/Users/igal/malwares/bumblebee/21-02-2023/archives//archive11.gz
[+] gz archive was created in:/Users/igal/malwares/bumblebee/21-02-2023/archives//archive12.gz
[+] gz archive was created in:/Users/igal/malwares/bumblebee/21-02-2023/archives//archive13.gz
[+] gz archive was created in:/Users/igal/malwares/bumblebee/21-02-2023/archives//archive14.gz
[+] gz archive was created in:/Users/igal/malwares/bumblebee/21-02-2023/archives//archive15.gz
[+] gz archive was created in:/Users/igal/malwares/bumblebee/21-02-2023/archives//archive16.gz
[+] gz archive was created in:/Users/igal/malwares/bumblebee/21-02-2023/archives//archive17.gz
[+] gz archive was created in:/Users/igal/malwares/bumblebee/21-02-2023/archives//archive18.gz
[+] gz archive was created in:/Users/igal/malwares/bumblebee/21-02-2023/archives//archive19.gz
[+] gz archive was created in:/Users/igal/malwares/bumblebee/21-02-2023/archives//archive20.gz
[+] gz archive was created in:/Users/igal/malwares/bumblebee/21-02-2023/archives//archive21.gz
[+] gz archive was created in:/Users/igal/malwares/bumblebee/21-02-2023/archives//archive22.gz
[+] gz archive was created in:/Users/igal/malwares/bumblebee/21-02-2023/archives//archive23.gz
[+] gz archive was created in:/Users/igal/malwares/bumblebee/21-02-2023/archives//archive24.gz
[+] gz archive was created in:/Users/igal/malwares/bumblebee/21-02-2023/archives//archive25.gz
[+] gz archive was created in:/Users/igal/malwares/bumblebee/21-02-2023/archives//archive26.gz
[+] gz archive was created in:/Users/igal/malwares/bumblebee/21-02-2023/archives//archive27.gz
[+] gz archive was created in:/Users/igal/malwares/bumblebee/21-02-2023/archives//archive28.gz
[+] gz archive was created in:/Users/igal/malwares/bumblebee/21-02-2023/archives//archive29.gz
[+] gz archive was created in:/Users/igal/malwares/bumblebee/21-02-2023/archives//archive30.gz
[+] gz archive was created in:/Users/igal/malwares/bumblebee/21-02-2023/archives//archive31.gz
[+] gz archive was created in:/Users/igal/malwares/bumblebee/21-02-2023/archives//archive32.gz
[+] gz archive was created in:/Users/igal/malwares/bumblebee/21-02-2023/archives//archive33.gz
[+] gz archive was created in:/Users/igal/malwares/bumblebee/21-02-2023/archives//archive34.gz
[+] gz archive was created in:/Users/igal/malwares/bumblebee/21-02-2023/archives//archive35.gz
[+] gz archive was created in:/Users/igal/malwares/bumblebee/21-02-2023/archives//archive36.gz
[+] gz archive was created in:/Users/igal/malwares/bumblebee/21-02-2023/archives//archive37.gz
[+] gz archive was created in:/Users/igal/malwares/bumblebee/21-02-2023/archives//archive38.gz
[+] gz archive was created in:/Users/igal/malwares/bumblebee/21-02-2023/archives//archive39.gz
[+] gz archive was created in:/Users/igal/malwares/bumblebee/21-02-2023/archives//archive40.gz
[+] gz archive was created in:/Users/igal/malwares/bumblebee/21-02-2023/archives//archive41.gz

Extracting the Pieces of PowerShell script

Each archive contains parts of a larger PowerShell script. Here’s how I extracted and concatenated them into a single script:

import gzip


ARCHIVES_FOLDER = '/Users/igal/malwares/bumblebee/21-02-2023/archives'
OUTPUT_FILE = '/Users/igal/malwares/bumblebee/21-02-2023/powershellCommand.txt'

countArchives = sum(1 for file in os.scandir(ARCHIVES_FOLDER))

finalString = ''

for x in range(0,countArchives):
    with gzip.open(f'{ARCHIVES_FOLDER}/archive{x}.gz', 'rb') as f:
        finalString += f.read().decode('utf-8')

open(OUTPUT_FILE, 'w').write(finalString)
2074441

The concatenated PowerShell script contains numerous base64 encoded strings, which, when decoded, form an executable. Here’s how I extracted this executable:

PowerShell script text: [byte[]] $mbVar is declared, then $mbVar += [System.Convert]::FromBase64String( followed by a base64 string beginning qlqQAAMAAAAEAAAA
Base64 chunks appended to $mbVar
ps1FileContent = open(OUTPUT_FILE, 'r').readlines()
REG_PATTERN = '^\$mbVar.*FromBase64String\(\"(.*)\"\)$'
OUTPUT_PAYLOAD = '/Users/igal/malwares/bumblebee/21-02-2023/payload.bin'
finalPayload = b''
for line in ps1FileContent:
    regMatch = re.findall(REG_PATTERN, line)
    if regMatch:
        finalPayload += b64decode(regMatch[0])

open(OUTPUT_PAYLOAD, 'wb').write(b'\x4d' + finalPayload[1:])
print(f'[+] Payload was extracted to the path:{OUTPUT_PAYLOAD}')
[+] Payload was extracted to the path:/Users/igal/malwares/bumblebee/21-02-2023/payload.bin

The extracted payload is a 64-bit DLL. Opening this DLL in IDA reveals that DLLMain executes sub_180001050, which contains an array variable with a pointer to an MZ blob and its size. MZ (the bytes 4d 5a) is the signature at the start of every Windows executable, so an MZ blob inside a DLL points to a second, embedded binary.

IDA pseudocode of DllMain: when fdwReason is 1 (process attach) it calls sub_180001050 and returns 1
IDA: DllMain calls sub_180001050

DLLMain will execute the function sub_180001050, which includes an intriguing array variable. This variable’s first value appears to be a pointer to an MZ blob, and the second value seems to represent the size of the blob.

IDA pseudocode of sub_180001050 storing the address of blobEmbeddedBin in exe_and_size[0] and 1479680 (0x169400) in exe_and_size[1], beside the .data view where blobEmbeddedBin at 0x180007320 begins with the MZ header bytes 4D 5A
sub_180001050: a pointer to the embedded MZ blob and its size

I took the starting offset of the blob (0x180007320) and added the possible length (0x169400) (wrote it in the IDA output window)

print(hex(0x180007320 + 0x169400))

And by double-clicking on the printed value it jumped to the offset which was the actual end of the blob data:

IDA .data view: zero bytes running up to qword_180170720 at 0x180170720
The blob ends at 0x180170720

Investigating the Embedded Binary

Using x64Dbg, I set a breakpoint at the array assignment of the blob and dumped the embedded binary for further investigation.

The lea rax, blobEmbeddedBin instruction in IDA and in x64dbg (at 00007FFB59571054); Follow in Dump on the constant payload.00007FFB59577320 shows memory beginning 4D 5A (MZ) and the This program cannot be run in DOS stub
Dumping the embedded binary in x64dbg

Now we can investigate the embedded binary.

Bumblebee Payload

To triage the Bumblebee payload and extract encrypted configurations, I uploaded the payload to Tria.ge, which confirmed it as Bumblebee and revealed the botnet ID: 202lg.

Tria.ge submission of payload_00007FFEAE987000.bin (1.5 MB): score 10/10, tags bumblebee and 202lg, file tree showing a .dll
Tria.ge: bumblebee, botnet ID 202lg
IDA: mwMemMov copies blobRc4Key into a local variable before mwConfigDec is called; blobRc4Key holds the string XNgHUGLrCD
The hardcoded RC4 key passed to mwConfigDec

RC4 Decryption

The loader function uses RC4 encryption with a hardcoded key to decrypt the blob of data. Here’s the script I used to decrypt it:

from Crypto.Cipher import ARC4
import binascii

KEY = "XNgHUGLrCD"
BLOB_CONFIG_PORT = "0b002425baa537efd52cf61f683f8116bc994d01c892b9c140f4a29c3f8a0b823f5a65b8dc08bb73c1e7ec5f5cb40ca4a45ea741c5367ad2368ea826d4e90a4c2f986b4cfd78e1038028d261f872279b"
BLOB_CONFIG_BOTNET = "0d042549dda537efd52cf61f683f8116bc994d01c892b9c140f4a29c3f8a0b823f5a65b8dc08bb73c1e7ec5f5cb40ca4a45ea741c5367ad2368ea826d4e90a4c2f986b4cfd78e1038028d261f872279b"
BLOB_CONFIG_C2 = "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"

def toRaw(hexVal):
    return binascii.unhexlify(hexVal.encode())

def initCipher():
    return ARC4.new(KEY.encode())

cipher = initCipher()
plainPort = cipher.decrypt(toRaw(BLOB_CONFIG_PORT)).split(b'\x00\x00\x00\x00')[0].decode()
cipher = initCipher()
plainBotnet = cipher.decrypt(toRaw(BLOB_CONFIG_BOTNET)).split(b'\x00\x00\x00\x00')[0].decode()
cipher = initCipher()
plainC2List = cipher.decrypt(toRaw(BLOB_CONFIG_C2)).split(b'\x00\x00\x00\x00')[0].decode().split(',')

IDA pseudocode of mwConfigDec: for vConfigC2Port, vConfigBotnet and vConfigC2 in turn it calls mwRC4KSAWrapper and then mwRc4Wrapper
mwConfigDec: RC4 decryption of the port, botnet ID and C2 list

Context

RC4 is a stream cipher: the key initializes an internal state that produces a keystream, which is XORed with the data, so the same operation encrypts and decrypts. Malware favors it because it takes only a few lines of code, but with the key stored in the binary it hides data from casual inspection rather than protecting it. The state advances with every byte processed, so data encrypted from a fresh key schedule has to be decrypted from one too; that is what the repeated initCipher() calls in the script do.

Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

IndicatorValue
Email SubjectYour Invoice Is Ready For Payment
Email ContentContains a link to download an archive from OneDrive
Archive PasswordRD4432
Downloaded ArchiveContains an IMG file with hidden .ps1 script and visible LNK file
LNK File ExecutionExecutes a PowerShell loader script
PowerShell LoaderContains multiple base64 encoded gzip archives

Conclusion

My analysis of the Bumblebee campaign impersonating DocuSign highlights the sophisticated techniques employed by attackers to trick users into executing malicious scripts. By understanding and identifying these patterns, we can better protect against such phishing campaigns and mitigate the risks posed by similar malware loaders.

Co-analysed with Igal Lytzki.

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